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Abstract: 
Whether its role is described as spoiler or opportunist, the Kremlin strategy in the Balkans is to 
drag its rivals’ involvement down to a level that would make countries of the region subjects to 
Moscow’s interference. Not integrated into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, burdened 
with endemic corruption, suffering from a democratic deficit, ethnic tensions, and protracted 
bilateral disputes, the Western Balkans’ countries are an ideal target for Russia.  
 
Preventive operations often seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival 
alliance. The coup attempt in Montenegro, in October 2016, is a good example of the Russian 
hybrid influence operations in the Balkans. The goal of Moscow was to prevent NATO 
membership of the country. 
 
To prove it, this work focuses on Moscow’s attempts to influence Montenegro prior to the coup 
attempt. The paper argues that the coup plot in Montenegro is the culmination of more than a two-
years long hybrid influence operation. This includes a) Russian attempts to influence Montenegro 
through economic means; b) Moscow’s effort to establish a lasting naval (military) presence in 
Montenegro; c) The intensive media campaign; d) Deepening Russia’s influence on pro-Russian 
Serbian nationalists in Montenegro and open political and financial support for their activities. 
When overt means of influence appear to have been inefficient, a covert operation looks like a 
viable option. That’s what happened in Montenegro. 
 
RUSSIA’S SOFT AND SHARP POWER1 IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE –  
THE RUSSIAN HYBRIDE INFLUNCE OPERATION IN MONTENEGRO 
 
Introduction 
 
As a professor from San Francisco State University, Andrei P. Tsygankov writes in his book Russia 
and the West, from Alexander to Putin2, Moscow’s relations with the West go through cycles that 
reflect its sense of honor. By honor, professor Tsygankov means, the moral cause, a set of moral 
 
1 ”Sharp power” is a term coined by the NED’s International Forum for Democratic Studies in December 2017 to 
identify authoritarian influence efforts that seek to pierce, penetrate, and perforate the political and information 
environments of targeted countries  
https://www.ned.org/what-is-sharp-power-christopher-walker-journal-of-democracy-july-2018/ 
2 Andrei Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010 
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principles, that is the purpose for Moscow’s interaction with the world and can be seen as a lasting 
national interest. As he explains, Russia’s long-term national interest revolves around three 
constants: sovereignty or spiritual freedom of Russia, a strong and protective state capable to 
uphold its interests, and loyalty to those who share Russia’s sense of honor. Russia today, more 
than ever since the fall of the Berlin wall, sees itself capable to successfully project its power in 
parts of Europe that share “Russia’s sense of honor”, including the Orthodox population in the 
Balkans. Though the Balkans is not the Russian near abroad, the Slavs from the Balkans are 
historically seen close to Russia. The perception of Moscow as a protector of the Orthodox 
Christians is rooted in regional history and popular narratives about the Russian sacrifice for 
peoples from the region.  
 
The growing Russian political and economic visibility in the region is remarkable. Recent Russian 
President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Belgrade and “a rock star” welcome3 is yet another confirmation 
of the Russian prominent role and popularity among Serbs4. At the time when leaders from the 
West rarely pay visits to the Western Balkans, President Putin and Serbian President Alexandar 
Vučić have met 12 times in the last several years5, which rebuts arguments how low the Balkans 
is on the list of Moscow’s priorities.  
 
Numerous institutes and organizations have been established to cherish pan-Slavism or Orthodox 
unity. Some of them are well known such as the Forum of Slavic Cultures or the Ruskiy Mir 
Foundation, others such as Night Wolves of Serbia, the Balkans Cossacks Army6 or the Slavic 
Brotherhood7 have unclear goals and serve as a cover-up for covert Russian activities in the 
Balkans. 
 
Whether its role is described as spoiler or opportunist, the Kremlin strategy in the Balkans is to 
drag its rivals’ involvement down to a level that would make countries of the region subjects to 
Moscow’s interference. And, it’s not such a difficult task. Not integrated into the European and 
Euro-Atlantic structures, burdened with endemic corruption, suffering from a democratic deficit, 
ethnic tensions, and protracted bilateral disputes, the Western Balkan countries are an ideal target 
for Russia. 
 
When soft power is not enough, Moscow seeks help from local actors, mostly nationalist elements, 
the Orthodox Church, Russian affiliated Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and academic 
institutions to capture and hold the political space. The ultimate goal is to prevent further NATO 
expansion and delay or halt EU integration. 
 
 
3 Euractiv, January 17, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/putin-to-receive-a-rock-star-
welcome-in-belgrade/ 
4 National Democratic Institute (NDI), public opinion research, November 2108 
https://www.ndi.org/publications/between-east-and-west-public-opinion-media-disinformation-western-balkans 
5 Deutsche Welle, January 17, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/vladimir-putin-to-meet-with-troubled-serb-
counterpart/a-47112884 
6 Telegraph, September 13, 2016, http://www.telegraf.rs/english/2354212-balkan-cossack-army-formed-in-kotor-it-
united-all-orthodox-nations-this-is-who-is-leading-the-warriors-video 
7 The Sun, November 3, 2016, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2108087/russian-led-slavic-brotherhood-forces-open-
up-new-front-againt-nato-in-heart-of-eu-by-deploying-invasion-and-special-forces-to-serbia/ 
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The case of Montenegro is a good example of the Russian hybrid influence operations in the 
Balkans. For a long time, Moscow had not considered Podgorica’s decision to join NATO as a 
sincere political commitment. The Kremlin believed that Podgorica’s Euro-Atlantic orientation is 
nothing more than a narrative to please the West. It was not until the membership perspective was 
within reach that Moscow took it seriously. From that moment on, it’s been trying to reverse it. 
 
Many still put a question mark over Russia’s involvement in the coup plot and doubt whether it 
was coordinated by agents from the Russian Military Intelligence Service (GRU). To prove it, this 
paper will focus more on Moscow’s attempts to influence Montenegro prior to the coup attempt. 
The goal of Moscow was, as it had been the case with other states aspiring to become NATO 
members, to prevent NATO membership of the country.  
 
The coup plot in Montenegro is the culmination of more than two years long synchronized actions 
that can be described as a hybrid influence operation.8 Those steps include a) Russian attempts to 
influence Montenegro through economic means; b) Moscow’s effort to establish a lasting naval 
(military) presence in Montenegro; c) An intensive media campaign; d) Deepening Russia’s 
influence on pro-Russian Serbian nationalists in Montenegro followed by political and financial 
support for their activities. 
 
The paper discusses economic cooperation, the attempt of Russia to establish a military presence, 
and media campaign. This work outlines Moscow’s most illustrative official statements following 
NATO decision to invite Montenegro and the Russian responses to the coup attempt. Those 
statements are very indicative as they call for action and imply that the Kremlin can’t stand still 
and silently watch the development in Montenegro. Due to the limited scope of this paper, it 
focuses only on the key events. For the same reason, the role of local (Montenegrin/Serbian) actors 
and the Serbian Orthodox Church will be left aside. 
 
Russian economic footprint in Montenegro. How big was/is Russian influence?  
 
For years, Russian investments in Montenegro have been a source of controversy in Montenegro 
and a focus of many economic and financial analysts in the West (the European Union). Although 
the official Montenegrin statistics and figures from Russia and Brussels vary, it’s the common 
understanding that Russia had been for years one of the biggest, if not the single biggest foreign 
investor in Montenegro. In late 2015, according to the national statistical company MONSTAT, 
out of over 4200 foreign-owned companies operating in Montenegro, more than 30 percent were 
owned by Russians.9 According to the Russian Central Bank, the accumulated Russian investments 
in Montenegro in 2016 exceeded $ 1.3 billion, which comprises 28 percent of all foreign 
investment in Montenegro.10 Many believe that the scale of Russian investments are even higher, 
 
8 Independent Analytical Center for Geopolitical Studies, Ukraine, November 6, 2016, Yuriy Radkovets, The failure 
of the Ukrainian Scenario in Montenegro http://bintel.com.ua/en/article/11-05-Montenegro/ 
Intersection, November 4, 2016, Julija Petrovskaya, Hybrid operation “Montenegro” 
http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-europe/hybrid-operation-montenegro 
9 BalkanInsight, Russian Dominate Foreign Ownership of Montenegrin Companies, Dusica Tomovic, August 18, 
2016 https://balkaninsight.com/2016/08/18/russians-own-every-third-company-in-montenegro-report-08-17-2016/ 
10 FinancialObserver.Eu, Montenegro Seeks Alternatives to Cooperation with Russia, Marta Szpala, November 8, 
2017 https://financialobserver.eu/cse-and-cis/montenegro/montenegro-seeks-alternatives-to-cooperation-with-russia/ 
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since numerous companies which are registered as local or companies from the EU are owned by 
Russians. 
 
On the other hand, the Montenegrin Agency for Promotion of Foreign Investments speaks about € 
1.3 billion of Russian investments from 2006 to 2016. In comparison, EU members invested € 4.5 
billion during the same period.  
 
However, the graph below (the source: Russian Central Bank) shows a downward trend of Russian 
investments in Montenegro, particularly from 2015 onwards. 
 
 
 
The scale of Russian investments in Montenegro can’t give us an answer on the extent of 
Moscow’s ability to exert its influence on Montenegro and control its foreign policy course. To 
find the answer to that question we should look at the structure of the Russian investments. The 
Kremlin’s economic footprint in Montenegro has a specific character. Unlike Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria, Moscow has no investments in the Montenegrin energy sector. Only 
recently, in September 2016, the Russian Gas company, Novatek, a younger partner with the 
Italian Eni, signed a 30-year concession for oil and gas contract with the Montenegrin 
Government.11 Montenegro doesn’t rely on Russian energy and is not connected to Russian gas 
pipeline networks. Unlike Serbia, Bulgaria or Macedonia, Montenegro has never been included in 
Moscow’s plans to expand its gas transmission system to the Balkans (the South Stream; the 
Turkish Stream). The same goes with Montenegro’s banking sector which has not experienced an 
extensive Russian influx.12 
 
Russia immensely invested in real-estate business and tourism. According to some sources, almost 
40 percent of real-estate properties sold in 2012 went to Russians. Montenegro was considered to 
have been a VIP place for Russian oligarchs and politicians. In accordance with the Russian 
Embassy in Podgorica, there are between 5000 and 7000 Russian citizens in Montenegro. Yet, 
Montenegro has been experiencing a different trend lately. Russians are selling their properties 
mostly to Turks and clients from Western Europe.13 
 
11 Reuters, Montenegro signs 30-years concession deal with Eni, Novatek, September 14, 2016 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-montenegro-oil-contract-idUSKCN11K2DS 
12 Ibid as 5 
13 Global Property Guide, December 10, 2018 https://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/montenegro/Price-
History 
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As it has been proved with the Montenegrin NATO membership and the decision to impose 
economic sanctions on Russia and introduce the entry ban of some Russian officials 
simultaneously with other EU members in 2014, the scale of Russian investments didn’t prove 
decisive in the case of Montenegro. Hadn’t Moscow lost control over the Aluminum smelter in 
Podgorica, it might have been in a more favorable position. That’s why the privatization of the 
smelter deserves to be briefly addressed in this paper.  
 
One of the Russian biggest investments in Montenegro was the acquisition of the Aluminum plant 
in Podgorica (KAP). The company was acquired for € 48.5 million in 2005 by the Central 
European Aluminum Company (CEAC) owned by the Russian tycoon and President Putin’s close 
ally, Oleg Deripaska. The privatization itself is a controversial case and for long served as an 
example of a murky-style business arrangement that countries from the Balkans do with Russian 
oligarchs. Negotiated in a non-transparent manner, described as a white-collar corruption case 
involving senior Montenegrin officials, the deal eventually inflicted a huge financial loss on both 
sides. 
 
The possession of KAP made Russia a strategic, if not the key, economic partner of Montenegro. 
At the moment of acquisition, KAP called Europe’s most run-down aluminum facility, accounted 
for 14 percent of the country’s GDP and more than 50 percent of its export. More than 50,000 
people were dependent on the company along with a bauxite mine that supplied KAP with its raw 
materials (both of them owned by CEAC).14 Deripaska’s company also wanted to acquire 
Montenegro’s only coal-fired power station which, at that time, was producing one-third of the 
country’s energy. CAEC almost won the tender, but at the final phase, the deal was blocked by the 
Montenegrin Parliament on grounds of national energy security.15 Had he won the bid for the coal-
fired power station, Russia would have been able to hold control over the energy and aluminum 
sectors in Montenegro. 
 
The honeymoon between CEAC and the Montenegrin Government didn’t last long. Their 
partnership has been smeared by mutual accusations and claims about business misconducts and 
the fraudulence of the other side. Due to mismanagement, the company went bankrupt in 2013, 
and their owners were not able to pay off its debts of around € 360 million. Due to its size and its 
impact on the Montenegrin economy, the Montenegrin Government tried to revive the company 
twice. The first time in 2008, issuing guarantees of € 135 million, and the second time in 2013, 
paying more than 100 million to foreign creditors from the state budget. By making these steps, 
the Government declared the KAP insolvent and took it over from Deripaska.  
 
Montenegro and Deripaska (backed by the Government of Russia) had been in a long legal struggle 
over the company ownership. CEAC failed a request against the Montenegrin Government before 
the Arbitration Tribunal in Paris and the UN Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). Finally, Deripaska failed a € 600-million claim against the Montenegrin 
 
14 The Guardian, Deripaska in Montenegro between rock and a hard place, November 2, 2008 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/03/russia-balkans-deripaska-aluminium-russia 
15 BalkanInsight, Montenegro’s Parliament opposes privatization plan, June 12, 2007, 
https://balkaninsight.com/2007/06/12/montenegro-s-parliament-opposes-privatisation-plan/ 
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Government for its unlawful takeover of the company before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).16 
 
The oligarch lost a case against Montenegro before the Arbitration Tribunal in Paris in July 2016.17 
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL in its ruling at the beginning of January 2017 dismissed almost all 
claims of the CEAC against Montenegro. The UNCITRAL’s decision confirmed that Montenegro 
didn’t breach the settlement agreement. It held the CEAC responsible for the violation of the 
contract obligations. According to the ruling, the CEAC was obliged to pay € 259,000 to 
Montenegro for breaching investments obligations and another 29,000 for not regularly submitting 
annual investment reports.18 The end to the CEAC lawsuits against Montenegro was put in May 
2018 by the ICSID which dismissed the appeal of the CEAC against arbitration ruling (by the 
Tribunal in Paris) in favor of Montenegro.19 Deripaska’s company was ordered to bear the entire 
costs of the arbitration valued at € 1.5 million.  
 
With the Aluminum Plant, not only lost Russia the chance to keep a hold over Montenegro’s future, 
but Deripaska (Russia) also lost the vast sum of money invested in the small Balkan country. This 
can’t be forgotten. 
 
Security interests: Russian naval base in Montenegro? 
 
Russia has a vivid interest to establish a lasting military presence in the Balkans as a counterweight 
to the US military footprint in Kosovo (the Camp Bondsteel) and NATO enlargement to the 
Western Balkans. Montenegro along with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republic of 
Srpska) seems to be an ideal partner for it.  
 
Moscow has a humanitarian center in Niš in southern Serbia, which, as many in the West believe, 
serves as a Russian spy outpost in the Balkans.20 The preparations are underway for a similar center 
in Republic of Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina to be opened by the end of 2019.21 
 
But, Montenegro’s geographical location makes it far more relevant in the Balkans’ context than 
one may conclude judging its small size. With Montenegro in NATO, the alliance has control of 
every northern Mediterranean port. A Moscow’s request for the permission for Russian warships 
to enjoy a special, preferential status in the Montenegrin ports of Bar and Kotor was an attempt to 
prevent this from happening. In September 2013, Russia demanded what former Russian 
ambassador in Montenegro Andrey Nesterenko described as a request to the Montenegrin Ministry 
 
16 CDR – Commercial Dispute Resolution, March 12, 2014, https://www.cdr-news.com/categories/arbitration-and-
adr/4828-deripaskaa 
17 TASS, Deripaska’s Suit Against Montenegro Falls Under Investment Protection Pact, December 8,2016 
http://tass.com/economy/917849 
18 SEE News, Arbitration Tribunal Dismisses All CEAC Claims Against Montenegro, January 13, 2017 
https://seenews.com/news/update-1-arbitration-tribunal-dismisses-all-ceac-claims-against-montenegro-554138 
19 SEE News, Arbitration Tribunal Dismisses CEAC Appeal in Dispute with Montenegro, May 7,2018 
https://seenews.com/news/arbitration-tribunal-dismisses-ceac-appeal-in-dispute-with-montenegro-611574 
20 Voice of America, US Sees Russian Humanitarian Center in Serbia as Spy Outpost, June 15, 2017 
https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sees-russia-humanitarian-center-serbia-spy-outpost/3902402.html 
21 Tass, Putin wishes Republika Srpska president victory at upcoming elections, September 30, 2018 
http://tass.com/politics/1023707 
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of Defense to “discuss the terms of allowing Russian warships temporary moorage at the ports of 
Bar and Kotor for refueling, maintenance, and other necessities”.22 If signed, this contract would 
allow Russia an extended mooring of its warships in Montenegro and provide for extensive use of 
the Montenegrin territorial waters for its operations in the Mediterranean.  
 
The idea of designating Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean as a standing naval task force 
emerged in 2012. It was prompted by the adverse security situation in Syria and the looming future 
of their naval facility in Tartus, Syria. The naval facility in Tartus was Moscow’s only navy’s 
repair-and-replenishment port in the Mediterranean. That’s why, almost at the same time, the 
Russians approached Cyprus and Egypt. In the case of Cyprus, the discussions began soon after 
the Cypriot banking crisis in March 2013, when the government in Nicosia tried to secure the 
Russian financial assistance.23 While waiting for Montenegro’s response, in November 2013, a 
Russian delegation had meetings in the Egyptian foreign and defense Ministries with the same 
purpose – to ask for a naval facility.24 Finally, Moscow partnered with Cyprus which allowed the 
Russian’s warships access to its Mediterranean ports. As part of the military agreement, signed in 
February 2015, the Russian ships will dock at the ports and will mainly be used “for international 
anti-terrorism and piracy efforts”. Furthermore, the agreement permits the Russian fighter jets to 
land on the base.25 
 
The financial support that the Syrian regime gets to keep a Russian naval base on its territory 
validates the Russian willingness to pay Montenegro for a similar type of agreement. According 
to Syrian Deputy Minister Qadri Jalil, Syria receives $500 million worth of fuel, and millions USD 
worth of deliveries of food, medicines, technical equipment, Russian weapons, and ammunition.26 
 
In December 2013, Montenegro declined the Russian request for permission to install a naval 
facility in the port of Bar and provide logistical support to the Russian naval fleet in the 
Mediterranean. In its letter to Moscow, Podgorica referred to the UN Convention on Law of Sea 
informing Russian partners that the regular, internationally recognized regime prescribed by the 
Law of Sea will be applied if the Russian ships need assistance such as refueling or maintenance.  
 
Russian Media Campaign in Montenegro27 
 
Troubled with problems such as corruption or the lack of institutional capacity and divided over 
NATO membership28, Montenegro was seen as a weak and vulnerable system easy to be targeted. 
 
22 Moscow Defense Brief: Russian Naval Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Problem of Projected Naval 
Basing by Aleksey Nikolsky (Jun, 2016) https://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2014/item1/article2/  
23 Moscow Defense Brief: Russian Naval Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Problem of Projected Naval 
Basing by Aleksey Nikolsky (Jun, 2016) https://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2014/item1/article2/ 
24 Ibid 
25 BBC News, February26, 2015, Cyprus signs deal to allow Russian navy to use ports, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31632259 
26 Ibid as 6 and7 
27 EU vs Disinfo, July 23, 2018, Russian influence in Montenegro: Disinformation, Threats, and Attempted Regime 
Change https://euvsdisinfo.eu/russian-influence-in-montenegro-disinformation-threats-and-attempted-regime-
change/ 
28 Opinion poll/DAMAR/January 2016 http://www.gov.me/en/News/157178/Latest-opinion-poll-47-3-of-citizens-
support-Montenegro-s-NATO-accession.html ; DAMAR was one of the two polling agency hired by the Montenegrin 
Government to do polls every month. 
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To influence the Montenegrin citizens and call for action that will reverse the Montenegrin 
trajectory towards NATO, Moscow developed a comprehensive media campaign and provided 
political and financial support to local pro-Russian political actors.  
 
The Russian press is not widely available in Montenegro29, nor is the Russian language widely 
spoken or understood among Montenegrins. To reach out the Serbian population in the region30, 
including Montenegro, Russia established numerous local outposts of the Moscow’s based 
media.31 The Russian media outlets are mostly based in Serbia. From there, they have unimpeded 
access to Montenegro. Russians extensively invested in Serbian electronic and print media 
narrowing space for media which are not under their control. The research of the Center for Euro-
Atlantic Studies (CEAS) from Belgrade mapped 109 Moscow-backed and media outlets active in 
Serbia at this moment.32 The region witnessed an outburst of Russian media in the Serbian 
language: Sputnik, South Front, Novaya Russia and many more.33 Sputnik is, by far, the most 
protuberant media profoundly engaged in the ongoing anti-Western campaign in the region. 
 
Portraying Montenegro, Russian media have developed a twofold narrative with a set of messages 
for the international public and another for the Montenegrin citizens. The campaign was 
particularly intensive a few months before Montenegro received the invitation to join NATO 
(December 2, 2015), and several weeks before and during the Parliamentary elections in October 
2016. 
 
For the international public, Montenegro is depicted as a highly corrupted, insecure and problems-
burdened34 state lagging behind all its neighbors, including Serbia.35 The NATO decision to invite 
Montenegro to join the alliance is portrayed by the Russian media as an example of “double 
standards” and a move motivated exclusively by Western interests to challenge Moscow.  
 
In messages for domestic use, the Montenegrin Government is described as treacherous, corrupted 
and bribed, a pawn in hands of the U.S. and NATO, not being worthy of support. The Montenegrin 
policy is shown as an example of betrayal of a traditional ally, and the Montenegrin leaders are 
painted as a group of traitors, the ones who would like to bring NATO to Montenegro (not 
 
Opinion poll/CEDEM/June 2016/Bosnian language https://www.trt.net.tr/bosanski/region/2016/06/24/istrazivanje-
clanstvo-crne-gore-u-eu-podrzava-61-odsto-ispitanika-2-odsto-manje-nego-u-novembru-517465 CEDEM got a US 
grant to conduct survey in June 2016. 
29 In accordance to polls regularly conducted by the agency IPSOS Strategic Marketing between 2012 and 2016, 
between 80 percent and 85 percent of the Montenegrin citizens watch the four biggest the Montenegrin electronic 
media: TV Pink, TV CG, TV Vijesti and TV Prva. 
30 Serbs live in several states in the Balkans: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and 
Macedonia 
31 http://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/global-instability-strengthens-russian-influence-balkans/, Nikola Burazer, 
December 12. 2016 
32 CEAS, Basic Instinct, September 2017, page 47  https://www.ceas-
serbia.org/images/publikacije/CEAS_Basic_Instict_WEB.pdf 
33 https://www.ft.com/content/3d52cb64-0967-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b, Financial Times, March 19, 2017 
34 Balkan Insight, July 29, 2015, https://balkaninsight.com/2015/07/29/montenegro-divided-over-nato-membership-
survey-shows/ 
CDM, May 31, 2016, https://www.cdm.me/english/damar-77-5-of-citizens-believe-montenegro-will-become-a-
member-of-nato/ 
35 Sputnik, May 1, 2017,  https://sputniknews.com/politics/201705011053162491-montenegro-nato-milo-
djukanovic/   
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Montenegro to NATO)36 without the will of its own citizens.37 They are shown as people willing 
to trade off the Montenegrin identity and dignity of its citizens for NATO membership. 
 
During his official visit to Serbia in December of 2016, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 
Sergey Lavrov pointed out that the EU was pressuring Serbia to act like “political leader of 
Montenegro, who broke all its promises and betrayed Russia”.38 
 
Russian arguments are popularized through social networks or the web portals of various Serb 
nationalist political groups in Montenegro, such as the political alliance Democratic Front (DF), 
the NGOs – Movement for Neutrality of Montenegro and No to war, no to NATO.39 As an 
alternative to NATO membership, they promote a hybrid concept of the Russian sponsored 
neutrality.40 They portray Russia as an invincible, stronger than ever power41, the guardian of the 
Orthodox Christianity and the acknowledged friend of all Orthodox peoples. Conversely, NATO 
is portrayed as a US-led war-bringing organization or as a fascist like organization that kills 
innocent citizens all over the world.42 
 
The effects of the Russian campaign have been mixed. Traditionally, Russia enjoys considerable 
popularity among the Montenegrin citizens, particularly Serbs.43 However, the major goal has not 
been achieved, Montenegro was invited to join NATO in December 2015.  
 
Russian official reactions  
 
Side by side with the media campaign, Russia played on political actors in Montenegro capable of 
organizing public anti-NATO protests with an aim to stoke political instability, call for new 
elections and replace the Government. In the run-up to the NATO Ministerial Meeting in 
December 2015, the hardcore opponents of NATO in Montenegro, led by the Democratic Front 
(DF), a Serbian nationalist, pro-Russian political alliance, and backed by the Serbian Orthodox 
Church staged weeks-long protests against the Government. In sharp contrast to the Maidan street 
protests in Ukraine or the street rallies in North Macedonia, the official Moscow expressed full 
support to protesters in Podgorica. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented that ”it is 
impossible to overlook the fact that… the involvement of this country in the process of Euro-
 
36 Russia Today (RT), Jun 6, 2017 https://www.rt.com/op-ed/391121-montenegro-nato-accession-europe/ 
37 Sputnik, December 22, 2015  https://sputniknews.com/europe/201512221032149372-montenegro-nato-russia-eu/;  
Sputnik, April 4, 2017 https://sputniknews.com/politics/201704051052306417-montenegro-nato-security/,  
38 RT: EU demands Serbia close Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center – Lavrov, December 13, 2016, 
https://www.rt.com/news/370197-lavrov-russia-serbia-eu/ 
39 Balkan Insight, October 18, 2017, https://balkaninsight.com/2017/10/18/pro-russian-montenegrins-publish-new-
anti-western-media-10-17-2017/ 
40 Balkan Insight, Jun 29, 2016 https://medium.com/@balkaninsight/putins-party-signs-military-neutrality-
agreements-with-balkan-parties- 8f2bbad4c23 
41 Sputnik, December 24, 2016;https://sputniknews.com/military/201612241048959394-russia-military-aggressor/,  
42 Sputnik, April 1, 2017; https://sputniknews.com/world/201704011052190789-montenegro-nato-accession-russia-
message/; http://orientalreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/anti-Nato20protest20october202015.jpg 
43 IRI – Center for Insights in Survey Research, October 2017, pages 26/27  
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/montenegro_ppt.pdf 
NDI – Between East and West, Public Opinion and Media Disinformation in the Western Balkans, November 2018, 
Section – West, Western Balkans and East  https://www.ndi.org/publications/between-east-and-west-public-opinion-
media-disinformation-western-balkans 
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Atlantic integration does not lead to its consolidation and prosperity... One gets the impression that 
plans for the expedite promotion of Montenegro into NATO simultaneously contemplate the 
suppression of alternative approaches.”44 
 
As Andrija Mandić, one of the DF leaders said the membership to NATO is unacceptable as "we 
(Montenegrins – author’s note) belong to a civilized circle that inherited the best traditions of 
Montenegro, which for 300 years had best relations, once with imperial Russia and later with the 
Soviet Union".45 Several months before the Parliamentary elections, DF was, by far, the strongest 
opposition party in Montenegro. It won 18 seats at the 2016 Parliamentary elections, two MPs less 
than in the 2012 elections.46 The group has built up its profile on the inflammatory, Serbian 
nationalist, pro-Russian and the Orthodox-conservative rhetoric and an aggressive, confrontational 
political campaign.47 
 
After NATO Membership invitation to Montenegro: 
 
Russian officials and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had made several warning statements 
following NATO decision to invite Montenegro to the Alliance. Not only reiterated Moscow its 
strong anti-NATO-enlargement posture but it also called for an action to reverse the process. These 
three points are underlining in all of these statements: 1) NATO enlargement in the Balkans is 
against Russian strategic interests; 2) Montenegro is “dragged into NATO” against the will of its 
people and people have the right to challenge the decision; 3) Russia, too, reserves the right to 
respond proportionally.  
 
The following statements are particularly suggestive:  
 
The day after the invitation, the Kremlin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov repeated the Russian 
warnings that "the continuing expansion of NATO and the military infrastructure of NATO to the 
east cannot fail to lead to actions in response from the east -- that is, from Russia." As he explained 
the action would be aimed "to provide for [Russia's] security interests and support parity" between 
Moscow and the alliance.48 
 
At the same day, the Russian MFA describes the decision “to launch NATO accession talks with 
Montenegro as an openly confrontationist move which is fraught with additional destabilizing 
consequences for the system of Euro-Atlantic security” and concludes that “this new round of the 
alliance’s expansion directly affects the interests of the Russian Federation and forces us to 
 
44 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, October 17, 2015, 
http://www.mid.ru/en/kommentarii/-/asset_publisher/2MrVt3CzL5sw/content/id/1871244 
45 Fox News, March 22, 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/03/22/montenegro-at-crossroads-toward-west-
or-back-to-russia.html,  
46 Inter-Parliamentary Union, October 16, 2016; http://archive.ipu.org/parline/reports/2385_E.htm 
47 Euractiv, October 14, 2016 https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/nato-and-russias-influence-
dominate-montenegro-vote/ 
48 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 2, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-nato-
invite/27401948.html; Financial Times, December 2, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/91f99dbc-990d-11e5-95c7-
d47aa298f769  
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respond accordingly.”49 Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman Maria Zakharova portrayed the 
situation in Montenegro as difficult, adding that Montenegro is troubled with "the internal political 
crisis”, which “is indicative of the continued deep split in the Montenegrin society, primarily, over 
the issue of NATO membership”.50 
 
Following the signing of the Protocol of Accession to NATO, on May 19, 2016, Zakharova 
accused NATO for "attempts to change the military and political landscape in Europe, in particular, 
in the context of its outspoken policy of deterrence towards Russia” and underscored that this, 
“will inevitably affect Russia’s interests and force it to respond proportionately," According to her 
announcement, “dragging Montenegro into NATO won't be left without Russia’s reaction”. She 
specified that "the efforts to artificially drag Podgorica into the alliance are proceeding … in 
defiance of the opinion of the country’s people."51 
 
Deputy of the Russian Duma, Sergey Zheleznyak, made numerous public comments against 
Montenegro before and after the elections. He openly called the Montenegrin opposition to “do 
something” to prevent the “erosion of democracy and abuse of the will of the people” in 
Montenegro.52 These statements are enhanced by similar accusations of other Russian officials 
including minister of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov53 and his deputy Aleksey Miskov.  
 
After the coup attempt: 
 
Moscow officially denied its involvement in the Montenegrin October’s events.54 In spite of its 
firm denial, ensuing the event in Montenegro, the Kremlin made a few divulging moves. 
Former head of Federal Security Service in Russia (FSB) and current secretary of Russian Security 
Council Nikolay Petrushev, a close associate to the Russian President, arrived in Serbia a day after 
Montenegro announced that Moscow might have been behind the coup.55 His visit coincided with 
reported expulsions of several Russian citizens from Serbia, which seemingly included the 
ringleaders of the operation in Montenegro.56 Though the official Belgrade called it a regular visit 
aimed at strengthening the cooperation of “respective intelligence agencies”, the timing of the visit 
 
49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 2; http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1963259 
50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 16 December 2015, Briefing by Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow; http://www.mid.ru/en_GB/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/-
/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/1989404 
51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria 
Zakharova, Sochi, May 19, 2016; item 19; http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2287934 
52 CDM, November 3, 2016, https://www.cdm.me/english/russian-mentor-dreams-of-a-new-operation-in-
montenegro/, 
53 https://sputniknews.com/military/201703231051876080-montenegro-nato-accession/, Sputnik, March 23, 2017 
54 Reuters: Kremlin denies involvement in alleged plot against Montenegro's PM, November 7, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-montenegro-election-idUSKBN132170 
55 BalkanInsight, October 26, 2016, https://balkaninsight.com/2016/10/26/russia-security-chief-advocates-closer-
ties-to-serbia-10-26-2016-1/ 
56 The Guardian, November 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/11/serbia-deports-russians-
suspected-of-plotting-montenegro-coup 
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and circumstances under which it took place made experts believe that this was an effort to contain 
the scandal.  
Following the visit, on November 4, 2016, President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin released 
retired general Leonid Reshetnikov, the former officer of the Russian Foreign Counter-Intelligence 
Service, from his duties of the Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) and 
appointed Mikhail Fradkov, the former Prime Minister of Russia and the head of Russia's Foreign 
Intelligence Service as a new Director. This decision not only illustrates the profile of the 
“Institute” but also supports claims that Reshetnikov had been deeply involved in Russian (covert) 
activities in Montenegro and the region. The dismissal of Reshetnikov was likely a result of 
Petrushev’s consultations with the authorities in Moscow after his visit to Belgrade. 
These personal changes within “the Balkans team” opened the door for Petrushev to become a 
Putin’s point man for the Balkans. Given his career and the reputation of a hard-liner, the shift 
indicates that Moscow will intensify and diversify its involvement in the Balkans.57  
The coup plot 
 
On October 16, 2016, Montenegro held its parliamentary elections. The night before the elections, 
former commander of the Serbian Gendarmerie, Bratislav Dikić58, had been arrested and accused 
of plotting a coup that would have involved killing civilians and murdering Montenegrin Prime 
Minister Milo Ðukanović.59 The police detained him and 19 other Serbian citizens, under suspicion 
of forming a criminal organization.60 
 
Soon after, the Supreme State Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime and 
Corruption presented evidence including intercepted phone conversations between coup plotters 
Bratislav Dikić, and Aleksandar Sinelić, a supposed founder of “The Serbian Wolves”.61 Serbian 
Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić confirmed on October 25 that the Serbian police had identified 
and arrested several persons in connection with the case. He added that there were numerous proofs 
for his claims, including photographs, videos, intercepted phone conversations, uniforms, 
confiscated money (€ 120,000 in cash) as well as legal confessions of some suspects involved in 
the plot. Russian daily Kommersant wrote62 that the plotters had used encrypted telephones, two 
of which had been discovered in Serbia and in Montenegro, and the third one, "located in Russia", 
had been out of reach. The cooperation of the Montenegrin and Serbian authorities resulted in 
 
57 Politico, Jun 21, 2017, Howard Amos, Vladimir Putin’s man in the Balkans 
https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-balkans-point-man-nikolai-patrushev/ 
58 The Telegraph, February 18,2017,  https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/18/reconstruction-full-incredible-
story-behind-russias-deadly-plot/ 
59 Press conference of the Montenegrin Special Prosecutor for organize crime and corruption, October 16 2016; 
Danas, October 16 (Serbian language) https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/tuzilastvo-plan-bio-lisavanje-slobode-
djukanovica/  
60 Press conference of the head of Police Directorate of Montenegro, October 16; Telegraf, October 16 (Serbian 
language) https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/2409148-mup-crne-gore-uhapseno-20-srba-osumnjicenih-za-terorizam 
61 Statements of the Montenegrin Supreme State Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor, October 17 and 18 2016 and 
Interview of the Special Prosecutor with the Montenegrin TV Vijesti, October 20, 2016 
62 Kommersant.com, October 25, 2016. Memri, November 24, 2016, Russia's Orbit - Part II - The Attempted Coup 
In Montenegro, https://www.memri.org/reports/russias-orbit-part-ii-attempted-coup-montenegro 
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extradition to Montenegro of Aleksandar Sinđelić, one of the key suspects. He and Dikić accepted 
to cooperate with the authorities at the early stage of the investigation. According to the 
Montenegrin police, Sinđelić received € 200,000 from the Russians and distributed the money to 
members of the criminal group. Sinđelić provided information about links between them and the 
two members of GRU.63 
 
The investigation into the case has confirmed the involvement of Vladimir Popov and Eduard 
Shirokov, the GRU agents, who are identified as the ringleaders of the operation.64 Shirokov, alias 
Shishmakov, had been the assistant military attaché at the Russian Embassy in Poland until 2014 
when Poland declared him persona non-grata for espionage65. Shirokov got a new identity and the 
false Russian documents in August 2016, two months before the elections in Montenegro66. He 
was pictured meeting with Alexandar Sindjelić in September 2016.67 
 
A joint investigation between Bellingcat and The Insider has identified the second GRU officer as 
Vladimir Nikolaevich Moiseev. Moiseev, alias Popov, the lieutenant colonel, was born on the 
same date as the fictional “Popov”.68 
 
Some plotters from Serbia and Montenegro are linked to the so-called Balkans Cossack Army 
formed in Montenegro on September 11, 2016. Cossack general Viktor Vladimirovich Zaplatin 
has been elected the supreme ataman of the “Army”. He has been living in Serbia for 16 years and 
is linked to the Russian House, a cultural center under auspices of the Russian state aid agency 
Rossotrudnichestvo, in Belgrade.69 He fought in Bosnia in 1992-93, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and in Transnistria. Zaplatin is described in the pro-Russian press in Serbia as 
"the official representative of the Union of Volunteers, which is directly associated with Vladimir 
Putin.” The Balkans Cossacks were in touch with Leonid Reshetnikov, the Russian Institute for 
Strategic Studies, and Sergey Zheleznyak, then deputy head of the Russian Duma. They visited 
Moscow a few days before the coup to meet with Leonid Reshetnikov70, who welcomed the 
formation of the Army.71 As the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta underscores, the Cossacks and 
 
63 The Telegraph, Russia plotted to overthrow Montenegro's government by assassinating Prime Minister Milo 
Djukanovic last year, according to senior Whitehall sources, by Ben Farmer, February 19, 2017; 
 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/18/russias-deadly-plot-overthrow-montenegros-government-
assassinating/,  
64 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 8, 2017 https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-coup-charges-
confirmed/28535744.html 
65 Radio Poland, August 29, 2017, http://www.thenews.pl/1/2/Artykul/323129,Poland-expelled-Russian-later-
accused-of-plot-to-kill-Montenegro-PM-report 
66 CDM, Februar 21, 2017 https://www.cdm.me/english/eduard-shishmakov-photos-time-officially-worked-russian-
federation/ 
67 Sky News, August 29, 2017  https://news.sky.com/story/photos-prove-russia-behind-montenegro-assassination-
plot-11010838 (added) 
68 Bellingcat, November 22, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/11/22/second-gru-officer-
indicted-montenegro-coup-unmasked/ 
69 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 18, 2016, Russia’s Friends from New “Cossacks Army” in Balkans, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/balkans-russias-friends-form-new-cossack-army/28061110.html 
70 http://cherna.gora.me/news/moscow-anxious-what-if-it-is-proved-that-russian-circles-were-behind-the-attempts-
to-cause-violence/,  November 4, 2016 
71 Official Statement of the “Central Cossacks Army”; Montenegrin Radio Skala; Balkans Cossacks under 
investigation of the Special Prosecutor, November 11 
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Serbian volunteers, who fought in Eastern Ukraine, are used by Russian secret services to carry 
out sensitive operations in the Balkans.72  
 
The recent announcement of the U.S. Treasury Department that Oleg Deripaska and Victor 
Boyarkin, a former Russian intelligence officer who now works for Deripaska provided financial 
support to a political party in Montenegro ahead of the country’s 2016 elections is another piece 
of evidence confirming the Russian involvement in the plot.73 
 
Conclusion: 
 
When Russia lost its major economic leverage in Montenegro (the Aluminum Plant), and 
Podgorica following the EU decision introduced sanctions against Russia as well as declined the 
Russian request to install a naval facility on its territory, making it obvious that: 
 
1) The Montenegrin Government was not anymore a partner willing to harmonize its policy 
with Moscow.  
2) Moscow lacked the financial/economic power to sway the Montenegrin Government. 
 
As overt means of influence appear to have been inefficient, a covert operation looks like a viable 
option. Pointing out that the plot was a botch, some take it as the key argument to describe it as a 
hoax. Yet, Montenegro seems to be one of the several Russian mistakes lately. The similar 
signature can be recognized in the fiasco with the poisoning of Sergey and Yulia Skripal. This led 
to the largest intelligence blunder since the end of the Cold War when identities of more than 300 
Russian GRU agents, including those involved in the Montenegrin case, were disclosed by 
Bellingcat.74 The same can be said for the foiled Russian hacker attack on the Organization for the 
Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague.75 
 
While the interests of Moscow to prevent NATO membership of Montenegro can be easily 
recognized, several questions related to the coup plot remain unanswered: Was the operation 
approved by the most senior Russian officials? If the Montenegrin Government knew of the plot 
beforehand, why were they waiting for the election day to arrest plotters? Did the Government do 
it to catch the plotters “red-handed” or was the day of elections purposely chosen to influence 
voters?  
 
 
72 Vesti, November 11, 2016,  http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/611438/Ruski-mediji-otkrili-sta-rade-
kozaci-i-dobrovoljci-iz-Donbasa-na-Balkanu;  
73 The US Department of the Treasury, December 19, 2018 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm577 
Telegraph, December 19, 2018 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/19/russian-oligarch-oleg-deripaska-
accused-interfering-montenegros/ 
74 Bellingcat, October 9, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/10/09/full-report-skripal-
poisoning-suspect-dr-alexander-mishkin-hero-russia/comment-page-11/ 
75 The Guardian, October 4, 2018 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/04/netherlands-halted-russian-
cyber-attack-on-chemical-weapons-body 
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The trial against indicted plotters, opened on September 6, 201776, was supposed to answer some 
of these questions and confirm the existence of a criminal organization who planned to carry out 
the coup attempt. After 19 months of the proceeding, the High Court in Podgorica, in its verdict 
on May 9 2019, sentenced 14 people on terrorist charges and creating of a secret organization as 
part of the coup attempt to overthrow the Government and prevent country from joining NATO. 
The Russian GRU agents, Shirokov and Moiseev alias Shishmakov and Popov, were sentenced in 
absentia to 15 and 12 years respectively.77 One of the plotters who happened to be in Russia when 
the trial began was granted asylum by Moscow.78 Nemanja Ristic and Predrag Bogicevic, 
members of Serbian far-right organizations, sentenced to seven years each, are still in Serbia and 
have never been extradited to Montenegro. 
 
Two leaders of the opposition Democratic Front, Andrija Mandic and Milan Knezevic, were also 
convicted over the coup attempt and sentenced to five years in prison. In a move to show the 
contempt of the court, they were not present in the court room when the judge was reading the 
ruling. Knezevic and Mandic dismissed the court verdict and announced an appeal to a higher 
court. They called the Serbian President and the Serbian Government to stop any communication 
with Montenegro and its President Djukanovic.79  
 
The majority of convicted defendants, including the two DF leaders, will remain free awaiting 
appeals to the first instance ruling as the chief judge doesn’t request their arrest80. This decision, 
surprising for many, speaks how politically sensitive the case is. The chief judge seemed to have 
been on opinion that the arrest of the two DF leaders, at this stage, might be politically harmful 
for the Montenegrin authorities.  
 
The ruling of the High Court in Podgorica didn’t put an end to the trial. It’s obvious that the story 
will be continued for years as it’s apparent that the court proceeding and the verdict didn’t 
completely resolve the case. The GRU agents, Vladimir Nikolaevich Moiseev and Eduard Shirokov 
are still at large as Moscow declines the request for their extradition. As long as they are out of 
the way, it would be difficult, if almost impossible to clear what happened on October 16, 2016. 
and who orchestrated the operation. 
 
Some suspect that the Montenegrin authorities are not interested in resolving the case completely, 
as it can be used as good leverage in further contacts with the Kremlin. This is even more so, if at 
one moment Podgorica and Moscow decide to work on their rapprochement. However, the recent 
 
76 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 8, 2017 and September 7, 2017,  https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-
coup-charges-confirmed/28535744.html  https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-coup-plot-trial-resumes-russia-nato-
djukanovic-mandic-knezevic/28719631.html 
77 Reuters, May 9,2019,  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-montenegro-court/russians-opposition-figures-
sentenced-over-role-in-2016-montenegro-coup-attempt-idUSKCN1SF144 
78 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 1, 2017,  https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-extradite-montenegro-coup-
suspect/28829550.html 
79 The Balkans Insight, May 9, 2019 https://balkaninsight.com/2019/05/09/montenegro-court-sentences-13-in-coup-
case/ 
80 The Balkans Insight, May 13, 2019 https://balkaninsight.com/2019/05/13/serbs-convicted-in-montenegro-return-
home-awaiting-appeals/ 
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verdict disapproves this reasoning. The court decision will make the gap between Podgorica and 
Moscow even larger and difficult to bridge as long as the current governments are in power.  
 
Preventive operations often seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival 
alliance. As historical examples prove, those operations can be cost effective especially if you 
stage them in collusion with reliable local actors. It is what happened in Montenegro in October 
2016. If the plot was to thwart the NATO membership of Montenegro, it failed. Yet, it should not 
be forgotten that states planning covert operations, if they fail, continue with their overt and other 
hybrid types of activities with the same goal.  
 
Not only will Montenegro remain in Moscow’s focus as it may profit from the Government (and 
policy change) in Podgorica, but the Russian involvement in the region will also continue to grow 
as long as the EU allows for it. While Moscow will rely on Serbia as the closest ally in the region, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina currently looks as a sitting target. Bosnian Serbs and, to large extent, 
Croatian pro-Russian local politicians, give Moscow a golden opportunity to advance its political 
and economic influence in the country. 
